Book Manuscript
☻    Reform Through Leadership in China’s State-Owned Economy. Under review.

☻    “The Political Mobility of China's Central State-owned Enterprise Leaders.” The China Quarterly (March 2018).
               Extensive research on the political mobility of Chinese officials at central, provincial, municipal and county
               levels has yet to fully consider an important group of elites – the leaders of China’s core central state
               owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper presents the first systematic analysis of their political mobility
               between 2003 and 2012 using an original biographical dataset with 864 leader-year observations. Under
               the Hu Jintao administration, these leaders emerged as a distinctive group within China’s top political
               elite: increasingly well-educated but lacking experience beyond state-owned industry, with both
               lengthening leadership tenures and years of previous work in their companies. Instead of a “revolving
               door” through which these individuals rotate routinely between state-owned business and the party-state
               to positions of successively higher rank, a top executive posting was most often a “one-way exit” to
               retirement. Of those who advanced politically, virtually all were transferred laterally along three career
               pathways with little overlap: to other core central SOEs; provinces; and the centre. This paper
               underscores the theoretical importance of disaggregating types of lateral transfer to research on Chinese
               officials’ political mobility and the cadre management system.

☻    "Firm Control: Governing the State-owned Economy Under Xi Jinping," China Perspectives (July 2018). 
               How has the Xi Jinping administration recentralised authority over China’s politics and economy? Studies
              of Xi’s rule often suggest that his “core leader” status, revolutionary heritage, and informal network of
              loyalists underpin this consolidation of central control. In contrast, this article focuses on the state sector
              to highlight how the Xi administration’s recentralisation of authority is grounded in existing governance
              mechanisms and techniques: central leading small groups, the cadre management system, Party
              committees, and campaigns. Using policy documents and an original dataset on central state-owned
              enterprise leaders, I provide evidence that the Xi administration has leveraged each of these four
              methods to reclaim central authority relative to the preceding Hu Jintao administration. These findings
              contribute to scholarship on adaptive authoritarian governance and economic reform in China by
              underscoring that administrations can use existing instruments of central control in divergent ways.

Working Papers
☻    “Building National Champions: Enterprise Groups in China and Japan.”
☻   “The Organizational Politics of Economic Reform in China.”
( * For further information about any of the papers listed above, please contact me)