☻ “The Political Mobility of China's Central State-owned Enterprise Leaders.” The China Quarterly (Forthcoming).
☻ “Firm Control: Governing the State-owned Economy under Xi Jinping” (invited submission for special issue of
China Perspectives, 2018)
☻ “Mobilizing for Reform: Policy Experimentation and Implementation in China's State-owned Economy.”
☻ “Political Leadership and Economic Reform in a Chinese Central State-owned Enterprise.”
☻ “The Political Logic of Central State-owned Enterprise Mergers in China.”
☻ “From Contractors to Stakeholders? Chinese State-owned Companies and Overseas Infrastructure
☻ “Evolving Official Discourse on National Interest in China.”
( * For further information about any of these working papers, please contact me)
Economic Reform through Political Leadership in China's State-owned Economy
What explains variation in economic reform outcomes in China? ‘Strategic design’ accounts highlight state and Party officials’ deliberate and explicit choices about economic policies, institutions, organizational forms, and resource allocations. ‘Organic transformation’ accounts emphasize dynamic change in economic practices, organizations, and institutions resulting from interaction among actors in a decentralized context.
I link these accounts to propose an alternative explanation focused on the leaders of public sector organizations—such as heads of central-level commissions and top executives of central state-owned enterprises. These organizational leaders exercise influence through two main mechanisms: 1) by formulating specific strategies to achieve broad central objectives; and 2) by altering organizational structure.
I assess organizational leaders’ impact on firm-level reform outcomes in China’s state-owned economy through: 1) statistical analysis using an original dataset of reform outcomes for all 189 centrally-owned Chinese enterprises between 2003 and 2015 (dependent variable: restructuring through mergers); 2) case study analysis of consecutive chairmanships in one of these firms, using data gathered through 15 months of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and secondary sources.
In the concluding chapter, I identify and analyze four feedback loops--flows of personnel and information--which link change at the organization level with the broader evolution of the institution of state ownership in China: 1) political promotion of organizational leaders; 2) the center’s selection of a particular organization as a model for wide-scale emulation; 3) government-directed diffusion of successful experiences; and 4) informal sharing of successful and unsuccessful experiences between organizations and the center.